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The internationalization of business is the subject of an extensive
theoretical literature as well as a growing number of historical
studies. Historians have paid relatively little attention to the
development of multinationals in the service sector, and studies
about international publishing are especially scarce. This article
discusses the early internationalization of two Dutch publishing
firms, Kluwer (now Wolters Kluwer) and Elsevier (now Reed Elsevier)
and confronts these case histories with the evolutionary theory of
internationalization. The Dutch cases underline the important role
of experience, knowledge and learning as well as of the national
context in which companies develop. They also show that these
factors allow for very different trajectories of internationalization
within the same branch of business and the same country.
Since the 1970s, research onmultinational corporations has expanded
enormously, reflecting the growing internationalization of business.1
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Our knowledge of how and why companies cross borders to conquer
foreign markets has increased, though there are still gaps in our
understanding of the process.2 The literature on multinationals
is primarily concerned with foreign direct investment (FDI) and
portfolio investment (PFI) of (very) large manufacturing companies.
Where service sector firms are discussed, it appears they simply
followed the manufacturing firms, setting up foreign branch offices to
aid these companies (e.g., financing, transport, and insurance). This
is justified to some extent, since a large part of the service sector
is indeed closely related to industry.3 From the 1980s, for example,
large industrial companies started to outsource their service needs,
stimulating the growth of the service sector. However, companies
in the service sector also possess specific characteristics, which
influence their internationalization strategy. For this reason, and
because services now account for almost half the total world FDI, the
service sector deserves closer attention.4
Recent studies on the internationalization of services have covered
trading companies, shipping, insurance companies, accountants,
consultants, banks, and airlines.5 Relatively little attention has been
paid so far to international publishing, even though very large
international multimedia concerns have emerged in the 1980s.6 We
(American research only): Klein, ‘Coming Full Circle,’ Enterprise and Society 2
(2001): 425–60.
2. Jones, ‘Business Enterprise and Global Worlds,’ Enterprise and Society 3
(2002): 581–605.
3. Numerous case studies are included in: Bonin, ed.,Transnational Companies;
Jones, ed., Transnational Corporations; Jones and Schro¨ter, eds., The Rise of
Multinationals in Continental Europe. Interest in the service sector is growing.
See Buckley, Pass, and Prescott, ‘The Internationalization of service firms’, in The
Internationalization of the Firm, ed., Buckley and Ghauri, 149–65.
4. The distinction between services and products is not always evident. See
Dunning, ‘Multinational Enterprises and the Growth of Services,’ The Service
Industries Journal 9:1 (1989): 6–9. According to Geoffrey Jones, using FDI as a
proxy for measuring multinationals is misleading because services are not always
very capital intensive and companies also use local resources for their investments.
See Jones, ‘Business Enterprise’, 588.
5. Jones, The Evolution of International Business; Jones, Multinationals and
global capitalism; Jones, ‘Business Enterprise’, Sluyterman, ‘Internationalisation
of Dutch accounting firms’, 581–605.
6. Book history is an expanding field. Although it covers the production and
distribution of books, it has not paid much attention to international publishing.
See the yearbook Book History and Altbach and Hoshino, eds., International book
publishing. A query produced no scholarly articles on the publishing industry
in Enterprise and Society or Business History. Business History Review showed
just one related article since 1991: Neiva, ‘‘Chain building: The consolidation of
the American newspaper industry, 1953–1980,’’ Spring 1996 Older contributions
to other history journals include: Springhall, ‘‘Disseminating Impure Literature;
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consider publishing is part of the service sector because its core
business consists in serving customers by finding, selecting, editing,
and distributing content.7 In the first section of this article we will
demonstrate that specific characteristics of publishing have led to
specific internationalization strategies. Section 2 will briefly outline
those theories on internationalization which seem to be most relevant
to the service sector, including publishing. The next two Sections
present case studies of two Dutch multinational publishing firms,
which will be used to test these internationalization theories. Section
3 presents a detailed analysis of the decision-making process at an
early stage of internationalization of the Dutch publisher, Kluwer (at
present, Wolters Kluwer). This case study is based on primary sources
from the company archive, especially the records of meetings of the
managing and supervising directors, published reports, and some
articles and books written by scholars and journalists. Apart from
some general remarks, we will not go deeply into the development of
Kluwer’s foreign subsidiaries after their acquisition, since this would
require substantial archival research for all these firms. In Section 4,
we will briefly compare the Kluwer case to the internationalization
of another Dutch publisher, Elsevier (today, Reed Elsevier), using
published sources (e.g., annual reports, books). The purpose of
this comparison is to demonstrate that different internationalization
strategies existedwithin the publishing business andwithin the Dutch
national context. In Section 5, we will evaluate the theoretical insights
we have used in our analysis, and suggest some refinements that may
guide further research into the history of international publishing and
the service sector generally.
Our argument can be summarized as follows:
(1) Acquisitions were the preferred method of expansion of
publishing firms, both at the home market and abroad. This
can be attributed to certain characteristics of the industry,
especially the importance of knowledge.
(2) The case history of Kluwer not only reflects the characteristics
of the publishing industry, but also points to factors
characteristic of the Dutch context.
(3) The importance of the national origins of Kluwer should,
however, not be overemphasized, because Elsevier followed
a dissimilar trajectory of internationalization. To explain
Rubin, Self, Culture, and Self-Culture in Modern America’’ Byrnes, ‘‘The French
Publishing Industry and Its Crisis in the 1890s.’’
7. Jagersma, Multinationalisatie van Nederlandse dienstenondernemingen, 66.
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Table 1 Scientific and Medical Publishers by Market Share (2001)
Science Medical
Company Share (%) Rank Share (%) Rank
Reed Elsevier 23.3 1 32.2 1
Wolters Kluwer 3.7 6 22.3 2
Thomson 5.7 2 20.2 3
McGraw-Hill 3.2 7 2.9 5
John Wiley & Sons 5.4 4 1.2 6
Source: Morgan Stanley Equity Research Europe, Scientific Publishing: Knowledge is
Power (London, September 30, 2002).
these differences we must look at their company histories
and the different market niches they targeted.
Both Dutch firms have been very successful in the publishing
industry. By the end of the twentieth century they ranked among the
largest publishers in the world (see table 1).
The Book Business and Internationalization
Because publishing firms differ in many respects from other branches
of industry, their growth paths also have specific characteristics.8 We
have defined publishing as a service business, even though until the
nineteen-seventies, many Dutch publishers had extensive printing
facilities. Since the production of print underwent so many techno-
logical changes during this period (photo setting, offset printing, text
and image processing computers9), and since from the late nineteen-
sixties some publishers started to experiment with new publishing
formats, for example, computer databases, one might expect consid-
erations concerning technology and production to play an important
role in decisions about international expansion. The management
records we have used show that this was not the case. At Kluwer,
printing was organized in a separate division, which was entirely
subservient to the publishing divisions. During the fifties, it produced
print for the mother firm at prices 10–15% below the price outsiders
had to pay (even below cost price, if necessary), and when a manager
8. Excellent discussion of these characteristics in Coser’s, Books. The culture
and commerce of publishing.
9. Van Lente, ‘Copy, composition, printing (printing presses, printing ink) and
correction.’
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of the printing division accepted more orders to keep the presses
running, resulting in delays in the printing of Kluwer’s own books, he
was severely reprimanded.10 When during the sixties the managers
started to discuss the expansion of Kluwer, they focused entirely upon
product–market combinations. Production facilities were hardly dis-
cussed at all and neither were electronic databases. What mattered
was what types of content to produce for whom. While during the
period of diversification some printing firms were taken over and
investments were made in new machinery, after 1970 these facilities
were increasingly considered too costly and not very lucrative and
they were increasingly being sold off, as we will see.11 We therefore,
feel justified in considering publishing as mainly a service business.
As to computer related technologies, they seem to have become more
prominent only at the end of the period studied.12 The most important
sunk capital of the publishers here studied, and most other publishers
as well, were therefore in the backlist or catalogue (the book titles
the company owns the copyright of), their knowledge of particular
market niches, and the goodwill of their customers.
The importance of knowledge derived largely from the fact that
the print market was highly segmented in terms of language, content
(e.g., education, entertainment, news, science), and carriers (journals,
magazines, newspapers, hardcover books, paperbacks, e-books). An
intimate knowledge of the market and the ability to single out new
trends were therefore of paramount importance. This filtering and
selection process was usually taken care of by a firm’s editors, who
maintained and developed a network of authors and other potential
providers of content.
The takeover of a publisher, therefore, did not usually require
the acquisition of expensive production facilities but was, in most
cases, limited to the publisher’s catalogue and editorial staff. The
purchase price thus depended on the market value of the backlist
and the expertise of the editors of the publishing house. Acquiring a
10. Wolters Kluwer archives, Notulen Commissarissenvergadering 6 January
1951.
11. See, for example, intensive discussions about acquisitions inWolters Kluwer
archives, collection Resius box 16, nr 162, meeting of managing and supervisory
directors 16 December 1968; and ibidem: Ontwerp prospectus explaining the
first emission of shares. Here, acquisition of publishing firms was given as an
explanation, not the need to invest in production facilities. Ibidem Vergaderingen
Raad van Commissarissen en directie, 11 November 1975.
12. See about the role of ICT in international acquisitions by Dutch publishers:
Van Kranenburg, Cloodt, and Hagedoorn, ‘An exploratory study of recent trends in
the diversification of Dutch publishing companies.’
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publisher with a well established market position was usually much
safer, faster, and cheaper than trying to open up a completely new
market niche, which required investments in building up a network
of contacts with authors and finding a market for the new product.
Because of these characteristics, mergers and takeovers have been a
normal feature in the book business since at least the late nineteenth
century. Merger waves in publishing have corresponded well to those
in other parts of the business world.13 Except for the USA and Great
Britain, which had beenmarkets for each other because of their shared
language, international activity in publishing was fairly limited before
1970. Mergers, therefore, took place mostly within national borders.
The USA had its huge home market, and European countries had
their colonies to focus upon.14 The variety of languages and cultural
differences in Europe restricted internationalization. One important
exception to this rule was scientific publishing, where the English lan-
guage became dominant after World War II, and which profited from
the explosive growth of science and technology during the Cold War
years. Elsevier was one of the pioneers in this market, as we will see.
From the late 1960s on, large European publishers began to feel
constrained within their national markets, and started to buy up
firms abroad.15 The merger wave of the sixties and seventies resulted
in highly diversified companies.16 The economic downturn in the
eighties, following the second oil crisis, reversed this trend. Large
firms such as Kluwer and Elsevier decided to reinforce the most
profitable parts of their businesses and to sell the less profitable ones.
This resulted in a focus upon scientific, professional and educational
publishing. Elsevier managers explained the logic of these choices by
means of the following diagram. (See figure 1)
The three uppermost levels were characterized as ‘‘need to know’’-
information, as against the ‘‘nice to know’’-information at the bottom
of the pyramid. At the very top were scientific books and journals.
They were mainly produced in very limited print runs for university
libraries. Because of their ‘‘need to know’’ character, the influence
of the business cycle was small and profit margins were very high:
between 30 and 40 percent.17 At the next level in the pyramid
13. Coser, Books, 22–29; Graham, ‘Multinational publishing,’ in International
book publishing. 242–49.
14. For international activities of Dutch publishers in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, see Dongelmans, ‘Foreign trade,’ in Bibliopolis. History of the
printed book in the Netherlands; Van der Weel, ‘Foreign trade,’ in Ibid., 242–43.
15. Graham, ‘Multinational publishing’, 244–45.
16. De Jong, Fusies en overnames.
17. Vermeulen and De Wit, Onder uitgevers, 246–49.
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Sensitivity to business cycle Geographical scope
International
International and national
More national than
international
National
Science
30–40%
Professional
30–40%
− − +
− +
 +
Education
15–20%
General
7–15%
Source: P.K. Jagersma, Multinationalisatie, 70.
Figure 1 Publishing triangle.
were professional and trade journals. Here, print runs were larger
and dependence on the business cycle was somewhat greater. This
sector was not as international as the academic one, but almost as
profitable. Print runs were again larger on the next level: educational
publications. Due to differences in educational systems between
western countries, these publications were much more national, with
the exception of English and especially American college text books
that were popular all over the world. Profit margins in this sector
were estimated at 15–20%. At the lowest level, with the largest print
runs and profit margins of 7–15%, an almost exclusively national
orientation, a high dependence on income from advertising, and
therefore, a great sensitivity to fluctuations in the trade cycle, were
publications for the general public, such as novels, books about
gardening and cooking, newspapers, and magazines. These hardly
lent themselves to internationalization. A Kluwer executive nicely
illustrated this in 1980, when he pointed out to his superiors that
it was impossible to create a German version of a Dutch fashion
magazine, because the Germans lagged two years behind the Dutch
in fashion.18 At the very bottom of the pyramid were bookshops
18. Wolters Kluwer Archives, RVC, nr. 98 (meeting supervisory directors 18
juni 1980).
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and printing facilities. These tied down much capital and were only
marginally profitable.19
Theory: the Internationalization of Companies
In his study on the FDI of companies in several small European coun-
tries, Harm Schro¨ter counted well over 800 different motives leading
firms to internationalize.20 Looking for patterns in these motives,
scholars have developed general theories on international trade, and
more particularly, FDI.21 The one that is most applied is John Dun-
ning’s eclectic paradigm, the so-called OLI-model, developed in the
1970s.22 According to Dunning, firms engage in FDI if they possess
advantages based on ownership, location, or internalization.
In 1989, Dunning applied the eclectic paradigm to the service sector,
but his exercise remained largely theoretical, and he did not discuss
publishing.23 At the end of his article, Dunning summarized his find-
ings in a table listing several variables considered important in the
internationalization of some service sector industries. The OLI-model
provides a handy framework for organizing factors encouraging inter-
nationalization of companies, including services.24 A major problem
with this model, however, is the large number of variables that are
potentially relevant (‘‘the shopping list critique’’) and the equally
unlimited number of possible combinations of variables that can be
headed under either ownership, location, or internalization advan-
tages. According to Dunning the ‘‘configuration of these advantages
will vary according to industry, country or region, and firm specific
characteristics’’.25 Furthermore, the model does not include a time
dimension, important in historical research: some variables become
19. Vermeulen and De Wit, Onder uitgevers, 45; cf. Jagersma, Multinational-
isatie, 70. Where Luykx found this idea, or whether he dreamed it up himself is not
known, but its basic ideas can already be found in Van den Brink’s essay in Else-
vier, Annual Report 1976, 408. It is also mentioned in Schiffrin, The Business of
Books, 117. See also the interesting interview with Vinken in Van Wermeskerken,
De jaren 90, 227–53.
20. Schro¨ter, Aufstieg der kleinen, 165–90.
21. Jones, The Evolution of International Business, 3–21.
22. Dunning, ‘The Determinants of International Production’. See also his
‘professional autobiography’: Dunning, ‘Perspectives on International Business
Research’.
23. Dunning, ‘Multinational Enterprises,’ 5–40.
24. Cantwell and Narula, ‘The Eclectic Paradigm in the Global Economy’.
25. Dunning, ‘‘Multinational Enterprises,’’ 10.
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more important over time, while others loose their importance. Dun-
ning addressed most of these critiques by extending and reconfiguring
the original eclectic paradigm. For instance, the concept of the invest-
ment development path (or cycle) (IDP) introduced a dynamic element
in the eclectic paradigm. This theory tries to explain how and why
the configuration of the OLI advantages of countries and companies
investing in these countries changes over time, affecting inward and
outward investments.26 Dunning and others also applied the eclectic
paradigm to investigate nonequity alliances, PFIs, external networks,
alliance capitalism, and patterns of trade.27 He further acknowledges
the increasing interaction between ownership and location advan-
tages, particularly in the case of innovation, R&D and technological
accumulation.28
In recent years, a new theory on internationalization has emerged,
which emphasizes knowledge and learning: the ‘‘Evolutionary Theory
of the Multinational Corporation’’.29 This theory can be taken to both
specify Dunning’s paradigm and adding a historical dimension to it,
in that it emphasizes the importance of knowledge as an ownership
advantage, and the acquisition of knowledge as a historical process.
Insofar as knowledge is incorporated from outside the company,
we may take this as a form of internalization. Evolutionary theory
suggests that firms will first export their products using agents, then
establish a small market presence (e.g., sales offices), followed by
production using imported parts, and finally production based on
locally manufactured parts.30 It is not necessary for companies to
26. Dunning and Narula, Foreign Direct Investment and Governments.
27. Dunning, ‘‘The Eclectic (OLI) Paradigm of International Production’’ and
Idem, ‘‘The eclectic paradigm of international production: a personal perspective’’.
See also the collection of essays: Gray, Extending the Eclectic Paradigm in
International Business.
28. Cantwell, ‘‘A survey of theories of international production’’.
29. Kogut, ‘‘The Evolutionary Theory of the Multinational Corporation’’; Idem,
‘‘Country Capabilities and the Permeability of Borders’’; Kogut and Zander,
‘‘Knowledge of the Firm and the Evolutionary Theory of the Multinational
Corporation’’; Idem, ‘‘Knowledge, Market Failure and theMultinational Enterprise:
A Reply’’. See also, Verbeke, ‘‘The evolutionary view of the MNE and the future of
internalization theory’’.
30. This sequence is known as the Uppsala internationalization model.
The main features of the model include a sequential or stage model of
internationalization, cumulative learning processes, and path dependency. The
model was first presented by Johanson and Vahlne, ‘‘The Internationalization
Process of the Firm’’. The validity of the model has been tested on numerous
case studies in different countries. According to Bjo¨rkman and Forsgren, there is
considerable support for the model, although not undisputed. See Bjo¨rkman and
Forsgren, ‘‘Nordic International Business Research. A review of its development’’.
See also Eriksson, Majkga˚rd, and Sharma, ‘‘Path Dependence and Knowledge
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pass through all these stages. A firm may bypass intermediate stages
and some are born global.31 Some companies will stop at the second
stage, while others may, in the end, return to a previous stage.32
After the closure of its assembly line, the Dutch subsidiary of the
Ford Motor Company became a sales office, as it had been before the
Second World War.33
This model was developed with mainly manufacturing firms in
mind, and therefore is not necessarily useful for the analysis of
services. Research on services points towards the existence of several
other forms of internationalization, including transfer of people (e.g.,
consultants, accountants), transfer of information over the wire (e.g.,
reports sent over the Internet), joint ventures, franchising, licensing,
and strategic alliances.34
The version of evolutionary theory developed by Bruce Kogut and
others stresses incremental learning processes of companies while
they internationalize their business. Skills and experiences gained
in the home market are used for entering and competing in foreign
markets. Companies will thus favor markets that most resemble their
home market (have a low degree of ‘‘psychic distance’’), because this
allows them to utilize their own knowledge. Since this knowledge
is acquired at home, internationalization will also reflect certain
national preferences and cultural factors. Following this line of
reasoning, companies will retain their national characteristics even
while becoming more international.
Because companies tend to expand into markets resembling their
homemarket, wemay expect the learning process to develop relatively
slowly at first, then accelerate, as companies acquire more experience
in the countries they have expanded into. The evolutionary theory
distinguishes several types of learning. For our purpose, two basic
types are important. ‘Routinized’ learning means that companies
develop their existing knowledge and capabilities by applying them
abroad. Experience in foreign markets will gradually broaden the
knowledge base for additional investments abroad. Companies may
then try to conquer different markets and sell products not related
to their initial knowledge base. This type of learning is called
Development’’, and several case studies in Buckley and Ghauri, eds., The
Internationalization of the Firm.
31. Knight and Cavusgil, ‘‘Innovation, organizational capabilities, and the
born-global firm’’.
32. Dicken, Global Shift, 138–39.
33. De Goey, ‘‘Ford in the Netherlands, 1903–2003’’.
34. Problems concerning a definition of services are discussed in Roberts,
Multinational Business Service Firms, 8–21.
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‘‘exploratory’’ or nonroutinized because it changes existing company
routines and introduces alternatives.35
Regarding the choice of entry mode, the evolutionary theory
points towards the nature of the knowledge firms develop in their
home market. Existing knowledge is usually already codified (e.g.,
articulated in manuals, blue-prints), which favors joint ventures and
licensing. New knowledge is often not codified and more tacit. If
this type of knowledge prevails in a firm, acquisitions are preferred
because certain business practices have to be imposed upon the new
firm, rather than sharing data or facilities. Tacit and noncodified
knowledge is often costly and more time consuming to export. This
kind of knowledge is usually a major source of competitive advantage
that firms might want to exploit when they internationalize.36
Acquisitions, however, are relatively risky and costly when
compared to joint ventures and licensing, while the potential for
learning new skills and knowledge is lower. Integrating existing
firms in a company requires more managerial effort and may
ultimately fail because of unanticipated cultural differences. This risk
is lowered when acquisitions are made in countries with smaller
‘‘psychic distance’’.37 The type of governance may further limit
risks: subsidiaries that operate rather independently from the parent
company do not require much managerial intervention. The choice of
entry mode will ultimately depend upon industry characteristics (e.g.,
level of innovation, capital requirements) and company experience,
which is connected with a company’s history and the national
business culture in which it has developed. For instance, companies
from highly risk-adverse countries will prefer licensing and joint
ventures.38 In order to understand trajectories of internationalization,
we therefore need to take into account the national contexts in
which companies acquired their initial knowledge and skills. The
economic history of the Netherlands from the late nineteenth century
helps to explain why this small country produced no less than
three multinational publishing companies (VNU is the third, besides
Kluwer and Elsevier). It also sheds some light upon the styles of
management that were developed here.
Because of their small home market and often limited natural
resources, small countries usually need to be more internationally
35. Hagedoorn and Narula, Evolutionary understanding of corporate foreign
investment behaviour, 3–6.
36. Kogut and Zander, ‘‘Knowledge of the Firm,’’ 637.
37. Kogut and Singh, ‘‘The Effect of National Culture’’.
38. Ibid.
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oriented than larger ones. But while most of them specialize in a
small number of export products and services (such as dairy products
in the case of Denmark, or shipping and fish in the case of Norway),
Dutch foreign trade and investment in the twentieth centurywasmuch
more diversified.39 This can be explained by its position between the
industrial giants of the late nineteenth century, Britain and Germany,
leading to mass production of foodstuffs for export and the flourishing
of shipping and related services (e.g., banking, insurance). It also put
a premium on language skills. In addition to being important as a
trading partner, Germany was also a leading country in science, and
many Dutch natural scientists had contacts with German colleagues.
This turned out to be a critical advantage in scientific publishing.
An extremely rich colony, Dutch East India (later: Indonesia),
provided raw materials (e.g., oil, coffee, and sugar), stimulating
industrial growth and transportation. Already before 1920, the
Netherlands, therefore, had a number of internationally active
companies, such as Royal Dutch/Shell and Van den Berg &
Jurgens (Margarine Union; later Unilever). During the nineteen-
twenties, Philips (electronics) and Akzo (chemicals) also grew into
multinational companies, and after the Second World War, DSM
(coal, chemicals) and Hoogovens (iron and steel; now Corus, after a
merger with British Steel in 1999) became important. One result of
this wide-spread international activity was that in the Netherlands
there were many entrepreneurs and managers who were familiar and
confident with foreign languages, customs and institutions—skills
that were critical for international business.40
Geert Hofstede and Peter Lawrence have described national styles
of management. In 1967–1969, and again in 1971–1973, Geert Hof-
stede interviewed about 88,000 IBM employees in 66 countries (as
we will see, this was a crucial period in the internationalization of
both Kluwer and Elsevier). His survey revealed national differences
on four indexes: individualism, femininity, power, and risk-taking
39. For a general discussion, see Wilkins’s ‘‘Dutch Multinational Enterprise in
the United States’’.
40. ‘‘[In 1985] 39 out of the 50 biggest enterprises in the Netherlands (Dutch
or foreign-owned) were multinationals. Almost half of them had a higher turnover
abroad than at home (. . . ) A recent survey of eight Dutch multinationals shows that
only some 25 percent of their turnover is produced in the Netherlands and that,
on average, 37 percent of their personnel are employed here.’’ De Goey, ‘‘Dutch
overseas investments in the very long run (c. 1600–1990)’’, 32–60. See also, Narula
and Van Hoesel, ‘‘Outward investment from the Netherlands’’; Van Zanden, Een
klein land in de 20e eeuw, 21–25, 48–58 [transl. J.L. The Economic History of the
Netherlands 1914–1995, London, 1998]; van Iterson and Olie, ‘‘European business
systems: the Dutch case,’’ 98–116.
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(time horizon was added later). According to Hofstede, the Dutch are
rather individualistic, highly feminine and prefer low levels of power
distance. They are somewhat risk-averse, while their time horizon is
moderately long.41 They also believe material rewards are less impor-
tant than a good quality of life. Like other European managers they are
used to dealing with diversity, are people-oriented and accustomed
to consult several stakeholders, not just the shareholders. Reaching
consensus, although time consuming, is considered very important
by the Dutch.42 Aggressive methods of internationalization (e.g., hos-
tile takeovers) are, therefore, not to be expected in Dutch companies.
Internationalization will tend to proceed in a piecemeal fashion.
Peter Lawrence, in his book published in 1991, used secondary
sources and interviews to investigate Dutch managerial practices.
According to Lawrence, a ‘‘[. . . ] cardinal feature of Dutch business
is internationalism’’.43 This international outlook is stimulated by
the Dutch preference to downplay nationality, to assimilate and
adapt to foreign cultures and by language skills. Lawrence believes
that these cultural traits are rooted in the heterogeneity of Dutch
society in terms of religion, which has expressed itself in the
educational system, political parties, labor unions, and the media
(a phenomenon known as ‘‘pillarization’’). This has fostered, he
thinks, a certain respect for different cultures.44 These cultural traits
are also evident in prevalent managerial styles. Dutch management,
according to Lawrence, prefers informal structures, honesty, long-term
relations, stability, and reliability. ‘‘The serious American focus on
the minutiae of marketing and strategy, performance monitoring and
accountability, sometimes seems a little excessive to the Dutch’’.45
The theoretical literature, therefore, leads us to expect some specific
features in the internationalization of publishing firms, as well as
some characteristics of the Dutch version of this process. Given the
highly variegated nature of the print market and the many differences
between countries, knowledge is a decisive factor in international
expansion. Whether acquisition or joint venture is the favored entry
mode depends to a large extent on the type of knowledge (codified
or implicit) involved. The Dutch economic and cultural context
favored internationalism and fostered a style of management that was
characterized by avoiding great risks, low levels of power distance,
41. Hofstede, Cultures and organizations; Idem Culture’s Consequences.
42. Bloom, Calori and De Woot, Euro management, 17–25.
43. Lawrence, Management, 2.
44. These observations were made in 1991; they are perhaps no longer valid.
45. Lawrence, Management, 120.
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decision making based upon consensus and reckoning with broad
interests, not just those of shareholders. Let us now confront these
hypotheses with the history of Kluwer.
Kluwer, 1885–1989: from Family Firm to Multinational
The Kluwer firm was started in 1885 by Aebele Everts Kluwer
(1861–1933), a school teacher who had turned to publishing.46
His first publications were connected with teaching: schoolbooks,
children’s books, and periodicals for teachers in primary and
secondary education. During these early years he also published a
reference work on the poor laws, aimed at town officials. This turned
out to be the beginning of a rapidly expanding field. In 1898 Kluwer
launched a periodical that grew into one of the success stories of the
firm: a weekly advertising journal called Vraag en aanbod (‘‘demand
and supply’’), which was sent free of charge (from 1902 for DFL 1, for
a year) to industrial firms, municipal governments, architects, railway
stations and hotels, and which yielded rich profits from advertising.
Its articles about new machines and products became a major
resource for engineers and businessmen for keeping up with the latest
developments. Because it soon reached a large audience, it offered
an ideal advertising medium for a series of books and periodicals on
technologies such as that of automobiles, electricity, and telephones.
Another very profitable venture started with the acquisition
of a textbook series in fiscal law called De Vakstudie (literally
‘‘professional studies’’), intended both for the instruction of aspiring
officials and as a compendium. During the nineteen-twenties the
series became available in loose-leaf form, which made it easy
for subscribers to insert supplements. This was the beginning of
a long series of loose-leaf publications on all kinds of legislation,
aimed at administrators, officials, and lawyers. Gradually, Kluwer
achieved a practical monopoly in this field in the Netherlands. The
loose-leaf system remained dominant until the arrival of computer
based reference works during the 1980s. Kluwer also acquired a local
newspaper (1913) and during the 1920s established a modern printing
unit, mainly for his own publications. The company was still small,
46. For the history of Kluwer until 1960, see van Lente, ‘‘Kluwer, family, experts
and managers: 1920–1960’’, Conference paper. The Kluwer archives are at Wolters
Kluwer’s main office, Apollolaan in Amsterdam. We are greatful to Wolters Kluwer
for allowing us to consult the Kluwer files.
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employing, in 1909, some eight persons at the office in Deventer, as
well as some salesmen and the writers and editors who worked for
Kluwer as a sideline to their own jobs.
By the nineteen-twenties Kluwer had, therefore, created a firm
consisting of a printing establishment, a newspaper, a small
educational list, and very successful lists of professional information
for practitioners in law, taxation, industry, and technology. The
continuity with the present-day multinational Wolters Kluwer, which
according to its annual report for 2006 aspires to be ‘‘the professional’s
first choice’’, is striking. It shows Kluwer’s understanding (or perhaps
intuition) of the growth of legislation and technology in modern
society, and the expanding demand for professional information this
would create.
Kluwer had four of his six children well prepared for succeeding
him: the eldest son studied business, the second law, the third
printing, while his eldest daughter prepared for becoming secretary
in the firm. The brothers and their sister started to work for Kluwer
between 1914 and 1921. In 1929 Kluwer handed the management
of the business over to his sons. The company was split into two
limited liability companies: a printing company, NV Salland, led by
the youngest son, and a publishing company, NV Kluwer, led by the
eldest. The second son was in a difficult position between his two
brothers. He eventually started his own list of esoteric literature, at
first within the Kluwer company, later as an independent firm. Stocks
remained within the family. The elder Kluwer served as supervisory
director until his death in 1933, when two of his sons-in-law became
supervisory directors (joined later on by the Kluwer’s second son and
his third son-in-law). After the Second World War, the Kluwer firm
entered a phase of spectacular growth, which put severe stress upon
the family based form of management and financing (see table 2).
Table 2 Growth of the Kluwer Firm, 1945–1954
1945 1948 1951 1954
NV Kluwer: employees n.a. 53 64 80
NV Kluwer: turnover (× 1,000 guilders) 376 1,677 2,725 3,278
NV Kluwer: profit before tax (× 1,000 guilders)a 56 260 530 672
NV Salland: employees n.a. 102 111 140
NV Salland: turnover (× 1,000 guilders) 242 706 1,010 1,317
NV Salland: profit before tax (× 1,000 guilders)a 26 143 112 44
Sources: Wolters Kluwer archives, collection Resius, box 5 nr. 81, report of accountants Klynveld,
Kraayenhof & Co to the Nederlandsche Participatie Maatschappij NV on the NV Uitgeversmaatschappij
Ae. E. Kluwer te Deventer, 30 juni 1955; and Wolters Kluwer archives, collection Resius, box 5 nr. 82,
report of accountants Klynveld, Kraayenhof & Co to the Nederlandsche Participatie Maatschappij NV
on the NV drukkerij Salland te Deventer, 28 june 1955
a In the reports cited for this table this is called ‘‘netto resultaat’’.
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With the growth of the economy and the coming of the welfare
state, the demand for Kluwer’s main publications boomed. The
printing business (Salland) doubled the number of its linotypes
and both companies invested heavily in office machinery. Clearly,
the companies had much difficulty in adjusting to the new size of
operations. At their offices, a clear division of tasks was lacking, and
the administration was constantly lagging behind. A consultancy firm
hired in 1955 noted, besides these problems, that the firm had no sales
and marketing section to speak of. This was understandable given the
almost automatic growth of the markets Kluwer was working for, but
it could become a problem in the future.47 The Kluwers then decided
to attract a professional manager from outside the family to help them
solve these problems and to guarantee the continuity of the firm after
their retirement. In 1957, J. M. Gorter became managing director of
Kluwer. His appointment was connected with the resolution of the
second big problem: the need for capital.
The financial policy of Kluwer had always been to pay for
investments from its own savings (internal financing), at the cost
of bonuses and dividends to the family, and in an attempt to keep
ownership in family hands. There were two problems with his policy.
In the first place, the investments needed to keep the companies going
exceeded the means of the family. And second, while the value of the
two companies had more than tripled between 1945 and 1955, this
wealth was represented in a limited number of shares, owned by only
six shareholders. Kluwer shares were therefore so expensive as to
practically preclude the possibility of sale (in case a shareholder died,
for example), and heirs would have to pay excessive death duties.
For both reasons it made good sense to create more shares, allow
family members to sell part of them and to invite outside investors to
participate in the firm.
In 1956 therefore, a share of DFL 500,000 was taken by the
Nederlandse Participatie Maatschappij (NPM), or Dutch Investment
Company, a bank created by the government after the War in order to
promote industrial growth. The six supervisory directors representing
the families of the elder Kluwer’s six children were joined by
investment banker M. Sanders, who represented the NPM on the
board of directors. As the minutes of the meetings between the
managing directors and the supervisory directors show, Sanders
was very influential from the beginning. He had the managers
47. Wolters Kluwer archives, Resius collection, box 5, nr 83, report by Van
Heus of the consultancy firm Meertens.
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draw up a business plan in order to make publishing decisions
more transparent. Since the NPM required frequent financial reports,
Kluwer’s administration was made more efficient. Free services and
unspecified payments to the Kluwer family from the company’s funds,
were cancelled. The yearly meeting of the family stockholders became
less important. Strategic decisions were now taken at the meetings
of the board of directors with the board of supervisors. During
the nineteen-sixties, the board of supervisors came to include two
representatives of the company’s bank, Algemene Bank Nederland
(ABN, today ABN AMRO). These men contributed their financial
acumen and connections and they played a pivotal role in the decision
to bring Kluwer stock to the market in 1967.48
Sanders was also influential in selecting the new managing director
J. M. Gorter. Gorter had no previous experience in publishing. He
had been an employee at plantations in the Dutch East Indies, and a
manager in a factory of woolen products in Leiden. It was his ambition
to make Kluwer the largest publishing business in the Netherlands.
Though he did not achieve this (in 1974, Kluwer was the second
largest Dutch publisher49), the company certainly changed a great
deal under his leadership. Gorter started a sales department which
conducted market research and the company transformed itself into a
medium-sized managerial firm.50
Kluwer’s expansion during the 1960s was part of a broad merger
wave in Dutch business, which is usually attributed to three causes.
The first one is increasing national and international competition after
the ‘‘sellers market’’ of the nineteen-fifties had faded away. European
economic integration and the appearance of American subsidiaries
are often mentioned in the literature. Diversification was one way
to spread risks. Especially relevant for the publishing industry was
the spectacular increase in wages after the government abandoned its
policy of centrally directed wages in 1964. Because publishing is a
very labor-intensive activity, firms tried to improve their efficiency by
increasing the scale of their operations. Finally, many Dutchmanagers
48. Wolters Kluwer archives, RvC (minutes of the meetings of the managing
directors and the supervisory directors), file A 55, 19 January 1967, 31/67, 37/67;
also Wolters Kluwer archives, Resius collection, box 16, nr 162, 10 December 68;
29 March 1969: preparation for introduction of Kluwer shares at the Amsterdam
stock exchange.
49. Wolters Kluwer archives, report by McKinsey, ‘‘Kluwer N.V.: securing
profitable growth. Introduction’’ (1975), p. 6.
50. The Kluwer brothers retired from management in 1958 and 1966, joining
the supervisory board.
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were deeply impressed by American management theories extolling
the large multidivisional firm.51
The firms Kluwer took over during the 1960s were mostly Dutch
companies with lists closely resembling its own. Noorduyn, for
example, acquired in 1961, published schoolbooks and fiscal works.
Veen, a literary publisher, was taken over in 1965 mainly for its
technical and government publications, while Tjeenk Willink was
the main remaining rival on the juridical market; it was taken over in
1968. By that time, Kluwer had reached the limits of expansion within
Dutch borders in the field of law and to a lesser extent in technical
and educational publishing. Internationalization was, however, not
considered a serious option at this time, since it would require
‘‘an altogether different kind of organization’’, as one director said in
1968.52 There were still sufficient possibilities in the domestic market,
provided Kluwer was willing to diversify into general publishing.
This would involve ‘‘leaving our more or less sheltered position and
entering the battle area, where relatively large companies like VNU
are active.’’53 If Kluwer decided not to enter this market, it would
itself be taken over by either VNU or one of the other large Dutch
firms, such as Elsevier and Wolters, it was believed.54
These considerations led to the takeover, in 1969, of two family
firms: Zomer &Keuning andOosthoek.With no topmanagers claiming
positions (these firms were led by gentlemen who were close to
retirement), it was relatively easy for Kluwer to incorporate these
firms into the company. However, these acquisitions could no longer
be financed by the firm’s own resources or by bank loans. After
becoming a limited company and accepting outside financial advisers
and professional managers, Kluwer now took the next step. On the
advice of the ABN, and with the blessing of the family, Kluwer shares
were introduced at the Amsterdam stock exchange in 1967.
As to coordinating the activities of so many different publishing
activities, Kluwer, like most other Dutch companies that interna-
tionalized, developed a decentralized structure.55 The annual report
on 1975 clearly stated: ‘‘Consequently, at Kluwer operational and
51. Sluyterman, Kerende kansen, 165–66, 203–13, 230 [transl.Dutch Enterprise
in the Twentieth Century, London, 2005].
52. Wolters Kluwer archives, collection Resius, box 16, nr 163, Raad van
Comissarissen, 10 December 68.
53. Wolters Kluwer archives, collection Resius, box 16, nr 162, Raad van
Commissarissen, 16 December 1969.
54. idem.
55. About this general tendency Sluyterman, Kerende kansen, 229.
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entrepreneurial responsibilities are primarily delegated to the man-
agements of operating companies - each functioning as independently
as possible.’’56 Each operating company was to develop its own pub-
lishing strategy, while administration and distributionwould be taken
care of by central units.57 The idea was that in this way the firmwould
make optimal use of the expertise of managers in their specific market
niches and stimulate their creativity and entrepreneurial drive.
By this time, Kluwer had some activities on foreign markets. A
subsidiary in Cologne, resulting from the takeover of the Dutch
publisher, Stam, in 1967, was only moderately successful. In Belgium,
Kluwer had a distribution center for Dutch language books and
magazines, as well as schoolbooks. Unprofitable establishments in
France and Switzerland were closed, and in 1978, Eska, in Bielefeld
(Germany), a subsidiary of Zomer & Keuning (acquired in 1969 as we
saw), was sold.
When Gorter retired in 1969, Kluwer employed 2,883 people (as
compared to 341 when he joined the firm in 1957) and company
profits increased from DFL 1,674,000 in 1964 to DFL 3,125,000 in
1968. Kluwer had successfully transformed itself from a family firm
into a managerial firm.
Gorter was succeeded by H. Klopper, formerly manager of a tin-
plate factory in Deventer. His primary mission was to consolidate
the firm, following the years of rapid expansion.58 This he did,
but he also presided over the first more-or-less systematic effort
at international expansion. This took basically two forms. The
first strategy was taking over several Dutch scientific publishers:
Martinus Nijhoff in 1970, Junk in 1972, Stenfert Kroese in 1973 and
Reidel in 1976. Although these were all Dutch companies, they did
strengthen Kluwer’s international orientation. Martinus Nijhoff and
Junk published mainly English language work for the international
market.59 Reidel also worked for the international market and had a
subsidiary establishment in Boston.60
56. Kluwer Jaarverslag (Annual report) 1975, 22; compare 1969, 18; 1970, 7;
1973, 8, 1990 (Wolters Kluwer), 21–23.
57. Kluwer, Annual reports, 1968–1970.
58. This is how Klopper himself characterized his work at the end of his term.
See Wolters Kluwer archives, Raad van Commissarissen, 11 November 75.
59. Wolters Kluwer archives, archief Wolters Samsom, WSG 460, bijlage over
internationalisatie van Elsevier, Kluwer en VNU, Kluwer, 2.
60. Wolters Kluwer archives, archief Wolters Samsom, WSG 460, bijlage over
internationalisatie van Elsevier, Kluwer en VNU, Kluwer, 2. In 1974, 25 million,
on a total 65 million worth of exports, was owing to Nijhoff.
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The second strategy was taking over and integrating, from 1974,
two small German law publishers, Kommentator and Metzner, in
Frankfurt. Both published in loose-leaf form, making them even more
similar to Kluwer. The owners were reaching retirement age and eager
to sell their businesses. Because these firms, although small, had a
recognized position among German lawyers, Kluwer regarded them as
a beach-head from which the German market could be penetrated.61
Both firms were reasonably profitable after the takeover.
Other options for internationalization were also considered at the
beginning of the seventies, but they were rejected. A ‘‘greenfield
investment’’ would require creating a market for the new firm,
which was very difficult in a country one was not familiar with.
A joint venture was another option. The one Kluwer started with
Harrap in Great Britain in 1971, trying to sell loose-leaf professional
publications, was however consistently losing money.62 In general,
Kluwer’s board of directors rejected international joint ventures
because it made it more difficult to impose Kluwer’s business
practices.
Klopper and his colleagues also had to deal with the internal
organization of the company, after the incorporation of so many
new firms and with the prospect of expansion abroad. Although the
company was structured in functional groups (printing, bookshops,
educational publishing, and so on) the ‘‘span of control’’ of the general
management was extending. In 1974, the consultancy firm McKinsey
was hired to provide advice on its future structure and strategy.63
McKinsey’s detailed analysis did not lead to fundamental changes,
and confirmed Kluwer’s preference for decentralized management,
allowing the operating companies significant scope for initiative, and
retaining brand names of firms that had been taken over.64 When the
61. Wolters Kluwer Archives, Raad van Commissarissen, box 3.006, meeting of
supervisory directors, 14 november 1973, nr. 51, idem, 4 April 1974. Kluwer’s
banker, ABN, had suggested several foreign firms for acquisition, which the
managers found too large (idem, 4 April 1974). More information about the
takeover of Kommentator and Metzner in Wolters kluwer Archives, collection
Resius, box 8, nrs. 97, 105, box 9 nr. 114,
62. Wolters Kluwer Archives, Zevenbergen collection, microfilm BZ 473.Sten-
fert Kroese to Zevenbergen 19 April 1977.
63. On McKinsey’s work for VNU, see Johannes and Cohen de Lara, Van
Haarlem tot Manhattan, 80–85.
64. Wolters Kluwer archives, report by McKinsey, ‘‘Ontwikkelen toekomstige
topstructuur’’, 10, 11, 15.
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board of directors and the supervisory board discussed McKinsey’s
report, they emphasized continuity.65
Kluwer’s law group, having already established itself in Germany
after the acquisition of Kommentator andMetzner, would now attempt
to take over a larger German firm. It would then use the same pilot
plant approach in France, but not in Belgium, where the market was
considered to be too small, nor in Britain, where the legal system
was too different from continental Europe. The science group would
not take over foreign firms for the time being, but focus, instead,
upon autonomous growth for which it saw ample opportunities. Its
contribution to internationalization would continue to consist mainly
in exports. Although generally opposed to joint ventures, Kluwer did
establish one with Nijhoff’s American distributor, in order to get to
know the American market, as it had done with the pilot plants in
Germany.66 The educational and general books groups would also
continue autonomous growth, in spite of McKinsey’s advice to start
an aggressive acquisition campaign.
The profile the managing and supervising directors drew up for
Klopper’s successor in 1976 is a nice illustration of the type ofmanager
Hofstede and Lawrence find typically Dutch. First of all, the new CEO
should be a team worker, used to leading a decentralized firm; he
should not be too autocratic and aggressive, but realize that there were
several ways to obtain reasonable profits; he should have a genuine
interest in the Works Council; and he should have experience in
international expansion.67 On 1 January 1977, Bendert Zevenbergen,
who had led the chemical firm Enka Glanzstoff in Wuppertal and had
been deputy CEO at its holding company Akzo, took office. During
the ten years in which he led Kluwer, the general management took
a firmer lead in the firm, especially in matters of acquisition, at
home and abroad. The supervisory board left important decisions
more to the managers.68 Soon after taking office, Zevenbergen started
a systematic survey of the possibilities of internationalization. The
results of this survey, and the subsequent discussions, give a clear
picture of basic approaches of international expansionwithin Kluwer.
Let us take a closer look at them.
65. Wolters Kluwer Archives, Raad van Commissarissen, box 3.006, 11
November 75.
66. Ibid.
67.Wolters Kluwer Archives, Raad van Commissarissen, box 3.006, 12 February
1976.
68. Wolters Kluwer Archives, Raad van Commissarissen, box 3.007, 31 August
77, 28 June 79.
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In February 1977, Zevenbergen sent the managers of the groups
in the company (education, law, technical, scientific, and general) a
notice setting out the main parameters of the problem, based on his
previous experience at Akzo.69 He pointed out that expansion of the
firm and the need to spread risks implied internationalization. This
process, he said, had been too slow so far. The central management
had left it mainly to the operating companies, which proceeded very
differently. The decentralized approach also had the disadvantage
that foreign firms operating on several markets would be insufficiently
noticed by the specialized groups.70 A month later, Zevenbergen sent
the managers a long list of questions, asking for a detailed assessment
of the desirability and goals of internationalization, the countries
where Kluwer had the best opportunities, the available manpower,
possible strategies, and organizational implications. He also included
a question about what the OLI-model calls ‘‘ownership advantages’’,
or in his own words: ‘‘What ‘contribution’ (other than financial) could
your group bring to an establishment abroad, in other words: what
is your specific know-how? Do you believe that management and
experts from the Netherlands should be sent abroad for a shorter or a
longer period?’’71 Zevenbergen, therefore, saw ownership advantages,
as we might expect, mainly in terms of knowledge and expertise.
The answers of the managers revealed great differences between
the operating companies with respect to experience and confidence
in internationalization, but all agreed it was necessary. The
Educational Group, whose international activities focused upon
technical textbooks, pointed to the need to cash in on expensive
copyrights, especially on drawings, by using them for publications
in different countries. A similar argument was put forward by the
publishers of popular nonfiction, which also used a great deal of
illustrations. The Law Group said that it had no option but to expand
abroad, since Kluwer was already dominant in the Netherlands. The
69. The debate can be followed in detail in the Wolters Kluwer archives,
collectie Zevenbergen, BZ 473, microfilm 6630-15, which contains reports and
correspondence February–October 1977. Deliberations at ICU, orWolters Samsom,
were remarkably similar, partly because the firm was similar: Wolters was mainly
an educational publisher, Samsom had grown large in government administration
(forms, reference works on law, and so on). ICU seems to have been a bit more
keen on the introduction of computer based systems than Kluwer at the time. See:
Wolters Kluwer archives, archief Wolters Samsom, WSG 460 bijlage bij Raad van
Commissarissen, 3 March 1976.
70. Wolters Kluwer archives, Zevenbergen collection, no date (c. April 1977).
71. Ibid, 1 March 1977.
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Scientific Groupwas treated separately, since its international activity
consisted of export rather than running subsidiaries abroad.
As to the ownership advantages, the managers were consistent in
their emphasis upon expertise, which they all formulated in terms
of what the evolutionary theory calls ‘‘tacit knowledge’’, consisting
of experience acquired over a long time and a certain style of
management. The formulations were somewhat vague, but taken
together they convey a sense of experience and confidence. ‘‘The most
important know-how we may successfully apply internationally,’’
wrote the Educational Group for example, ‘‘is not in patents, processes
or products, but in the attitude of our people towards the market,
which we cannot easily transfer to others. We therefore prefer to
expand not too fast.’’ And: ‘‘The organization of the group is not
based upon explicit directives but upon a common way of thinking
that has grown over the years, and by which decisions can easily
be delegated. The manager of the group and his administrator
‘supervise’ this organization. Functionaries communicate directly
across organizational boundaries.’’ The Law Group wrote that Dutch
managers would have to be sent abroad in order to transfer their know-
how. Local functionaries should work under Dutch managers. They
mentioned loose-leaf and other, unspecified systems as a special
advantage of Kluwer.72 A larger firm, wrote the Technical and
Newspaper Group, should only be taken over if the local managers
would accept ‘‘Kluwer people to supplement their know-how.’’ This
would be easier with smaller firms, several of which were available
in Germany.73
The Kluwer board of directors concluded in April 1977 that
expansion should take place by acquisition of firms abroad and at
home, as well as by expansion of the already existing firms, rather
than by starting wholly new establishments. All operating companies
would work on this, while the general management would try to find
a somewhat larger firm in Germany to take over.74
FromAugust 1977 Zevenbergen and his staff undertook a systematic
survey of German publishers that might be taken over—Germany
being the country which all the managers Zevenbergen consulted
72. The unspecified systems were probably computer networks for jurispru-
dence, in which Kluwer claimed a pioneering role: Wolters Kluwer Archives, Raad
van Commissarissen, box 3.007, 31 August 77
73. Wolters Kluwer archives, Zevenbergen collection, BZ 473, Reply by KDTU
no date (Spring 77).
74. Wolters Kluwer archives, Zevenbergen collection, BZ 473, letter by
B. Zevenbergen, 19 August 1977.
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had put on top of their list. Zevenbergen also used the services of
the Industrie-Vermittlungsdienst (Industrial Agency) of the Deutsche
Bank, which collected information about firms that might interest
Kluwer and established the first contacts.75 Kluwer aimed at middle-
sized firms, that is, those having a turnover of between 25 and
50 million Deutsche Mark.76 In the annual reports, it spoke of a
policy of ‘‘cautious expansion.’’77 But middle-sized firms turned out
to be very expensive. This was also the case in the USA, where Kluwer
tried to expand into some years later, because there were many rivals
in takeover bids. Therefore, the going was slow.78 Nevertheless, small
acquisitions in the fields of law, medicine, and education continued
during the nineteen-seventies and eighties, at first mostly in Germany
and Britain, during the 1980s also in France and the USA.79
On average, the activities abroadweremore profitable thanKluwer’s
domestic activities. It was a major reason why the firm continued to
grow in spite of domestic problems during the recession of the early
1980s. The second oil crisis led to a sharp downturn in the publishing
business. The market for encyclopedias collapsed, general books
declined, and so did advertisements, which supported its newspapers
and magazines. The government cut back its budget for education.
There was overcapacity in the printing business, while at the same
time large investments were needed for new machinery. Publishing
companies reacted by selling off or liquidating their printing firms and
publishers of general magazines and books. Kluwer concentrated its
efforts on the most profitable markets: science, professional and trade
journals, and education (including courses and electronic media). It
was part of a ‘‘retreat from conglomeracy’’ which was an international
trend in business during the 1980s.80
In all, internationalization proceeded more slowly than Zevenber-
gen and his colleagues wished, but in 1986 foreign activities had
increased significantly. Turnover abroad, for example, grew from
75. Wolters Kluwer archives, Zevenbergen collection, BZ 473, nrs. 28–99,
exhange between Zevenbergen and representatives of the Deutsche Bank,
August–October 1977.
76. Wolters Kluwer archives, collection Zevenbergen, BZ 473, reactions of the
managers of the groups, March–April 1977; note by Resius, 25 July 1977; letter by
Zevenbergen, 19 August 1977.
77. Kluwer, Annual report 1979, 9; Kluwer, Annual Report 1980, 9.
78.Wolters Kluwer Archives, Raad van Commissarissen, box 3.007, 15 February
1979.
79. Kluwer, Annual reports 1977–1990.
80. Jagersma, Multinationalisatie, 122; De Vries, Four windows, 142–43. Reed,
e.g., sold its paper and paint plants, Thomson its oil, etc.: Graham, ‘‘Multinational
publishing’’, 244.
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Table 3 Kluwer Turnover and Personnel, 1980–1986
1980 1982 1984 1986
Turnover in Netherlands (million guilders) 676 785 892 966
Index 100 116 132 143
Turnover abroad (in million guilders) 134 171 236 269
Index 100 128 176 201
Employees in the Netherlands 4,102 4,117 4,082 4,034
Index 100 100.4 99.5 98.3
Employees abroad 392 498 581 787
Index 100 127 148 201
Source: Kluwer, Annual reports, 1980–1986.a
a Turnover is here defined as ‘‘Omzet aan derden.’’
about 19 percent of total turnover in 197481 to 28 percent in 1986. The
number of employees abroad continued to growwhile their number in
the Netherlands declined slightly (see table 3). One important boost
to legal publishing consisted in the increasing number of laws and
regulations of the European Union, which had to be translated into
the languages of all the member states.82
In the summer of 1986, the Dutch publisher Elsevier, of which more
below, proposed a merger with Kluwer. Elsevier was mainly active in
scientific and legal publishing and its CEO, P. Vinken, saw the two
firms as ideal partners. He also believed that as a result of increasing
competition and the great merger movement only ten to twenty large
international publishers would be left in the immediate future, and
he wanted Elsevier to have a controlling position in one of them.
The Kluwer managers, however, rejected the merger proposal because
the organizational structure and corporate culture at Elsevier were too
different. They also did not share Vinken’s quasi-Darwinian ‘‘dinosaur
theory’’ as it was sometimes called.83 Kluwer’s CEO at the time, J. J. C.
Alberdingk Tijm (who had succeeded Zevenbergen in 1987), believed
that in the future, firms of different sizes would continue to prosper.84
One year later, Elsevier attempted a hostile takeover which failed,
because a smaller Dutch firm, Wolters Samsom, succeeded in taking
81. Wolters Kluwer archives, archief Wolters Samsom, WSG 460, ‘‘Bijlage op
internationalisatie Kluwer’’ (1975), p. 2.
82. De Vries, Four windows, 217.
83. Vinken, in Elsevier’s annual report for 1986, cited in DeVries, Fourwindows,
187. For the dinosaur theory, also embraced by Robert Maxwell, see Noble, ‘‘The
media merger wave of the 1980s’’, 5.
84. Quoted in De Vries, Four windows, 188.
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over Kluwer. After the merger, Wolters and Kluwer continued their
internationalization together.85
Kluwer’s internationalization strategy, therefore, consisted mainly
in taking over small (family) firms abroad, as well as an occasional
joint venture, by means of which knowledge of the foreign market
was internalized. Expertise in international expansion was acquired
by appointing a CEO with experience in this field, although
Zevenbergen had been employed in an altogether different type
of company. Another source of information was the German
Vermittlungsdienst. German acquisitions served as a kind of test
case or learning site. Although the central management took the
lead in internationalization, Kluwer maintained its decentralized
structure as the best means to use local knowledge and stimulate
the entrepreneurial spirit in its managers.
Elsevier: a Brief Comparison
The basis for Elsevier’s prominent international position as a scientific
publisher was laid by J. P. Klautz, who after two years as secretary
of the owner became managing director in 1929. He made the ailing
business successful by publishing a new edition of a multivolume
encyclopedia that had been one of Elsevier’s first ventures, and
attracting some novelists that became very popular. After the war,
another edition of the encyclopedia, more popular novels, and
Elsevier’s Weekblad, an imitation of Time Magazine, were the bases
for Elsevier’s growth. Scientific publishing only became prominent
after 1955, but the foundations of Elsevier’s astonishing success in
this field had been laid by Klautz during the decade before the war.
During the 1930s, Klautz started to publish works of German Jewish
scientists who had run into trouble with the Nazi regime. In 1938, he
published a very successful English edition of Paul Karrer’s handbook
of organic chemistry, and acquired English language rights for several
other reference works by prominent German scientific publishers,
such as Thieme and Springer. In 1945, Klautz created a special
branch, Elsevier’s Wetenschappelijke Uitgeverij (EWU) for these
activities. The first scientific journal Elsevier published, Biochimica
85. De Vries, Four windows, 216. Whereas in 1987, 62 percent of sales were still
in the Netherlands, six years later this figure had dropped to thirty seven. Sales
in Europe accounted for 45 percent, 11 percent in the USA and 7 percent in other
countries.
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et Biophysica Acta (started in 1947) also sprang from the work of
a German scientist, Carl Oppenheimer, whose journal, Enzymologia,
had been discontinued by the Nazis in 1941. Ironically, Klautz lost his
position as managing director as a consequence of his most ambitious
international venture: an attempt to conquer the American market for
medical encyclopedias. A joint venture with a small university press
in Houston turned out to be a costly failure. When Klautz finally
left Elsevier in 1953, EWU worked for a small international market
and profitability was low. Like Kluwer and other Dutch publishers,
Elsevier had a sales office in Belgium, and its encyclopedia sold well
in the Belgian market.
Klautz’s successor, the economist Dolf van den Brink, aimed at
a steady profitability of the firm by means of a countercyclical
policy. He argued that multivolume encyclopedias, appearing in
the course of several years and paid for in advance by customers,
attenuated the influence economic downturns such as during the
Korea crisis in 1950 and the short recession in 1957. So did scientific
books and journals, especially the latter, because they were sold by
subscription. Scientific works were, according to Van den Brink, less
vulnerable to competition from television than general fiction and
magazines. Consequently Elsevier started to publish a whole range
of encyclopedias in Dutch (for ladies, agriculture, technology, and so
on) as well as scientific works in English for the international market.
The scientific market grew spectacularly during the Cold War years,
when all western countries invested huge sums in scientific research
and higher education.86
From 1955, EWU started to grow quickly and already in 1961
Publishers weekly called Elsevier ‘‘one of the world’s leading
publishers of scientific books.’’87 Elsevier’s successes have been
attributed to the fact that it produced a new type of scholarly
journal. In most countries, including the US, science publishing was
in the hands of either scholarly societies or university presses. Their
journals covered broad areas of learning, such as physics or chemistry.
Elsevier’s new journals, in contrast, were either more specialized (for
example, nuclear physics) or they covered an interdisciplinary field
(like biochemistry). This, together with a highly selective editorial
86. CBS (Dutch Statistics), Tachtig jaren statistiek in tijdreeksen (Den Haag,
1979), 48.
87. Publisher’s weekly 16 April 1962, reprinted in Elsevier’s Annual report
1961, 28.
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policy, quickly earned Elsevier great prestige in the international
scientific community.88
In 1969 and 1971, Elsevier acquired two Dutch scientific pub-
lishers, the Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij and Excerpta
Medica, which proved to be very important for Elsevier’s subsequent
development. Both had German roots. M. D. Frank, who led the
Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, had worked as a trainee
at the Akademische Verlagsanstalt in Leipzig in 1934, and Excerpta
Medica was started as a limited liability company in 1947 by German
immigrants and Dutch physicians, publishers, and bankers.89 In 1969,
the Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij published thirty sci-
entific journals in English. Most of the copies were sold abroad.90
Excerpta Medica published excerpts from medical journals, which
helped doctors keep abreast of the rapidly growing international liter-
ature. During the sixties, it employed some 100 Dutch and some 4,000
foreign doctors, who processed about 250,000 medical publications
a year.91 Excerpta Medica was important to Elsevier because of its
pioneering electronic databases, providing Elsevier with a headstart
in this new field. The neurosurgeon, Pierre Vinken, who had led
Excepta Medica from 1963, became the Managing Director of Associ-
ated Science Publishers, which in 1969, succeeded EWU as Elsevier’s
scientific division. Internationalization continued apace, with acqui-
sitions and establishments, during the nineteen-seventies, in Mexico,
Spain, Brazil, Ireland, Great Britain, and the USA. In 1975 scientific
publications already accounted for 27 percent of Elsevier’s turnover.92
Like other large publishers, Elsevier diversified during the nineteen-
sixties. For example, in 1968, Elsevier took over theDutch firm,Misset,
a publisher of professional and trade journals, in a joint venture with
the British IPC Business Press. As at Kluwer, book shops and printing
firms were acquired. Some foreign firms were bought, among others,
Phaidon (art books), in London in 1974, and the New York firm Dut-
ton, a publisher of general books and children’s books in 1975.93 Van
88. Meadows, ‘‘European science publishing and the United States’’, 241,
244–45.
89. Van Leeuwen, ‘‘The decisive years for international science publishing in
the Netherlands’’, 256, 262–63.
90. Van Leeuwen, ‘‘The decisive years’’; Frank, ‘‘Internationaal uitgeven’’,
74–84.
91. Vermeulen and De Wit, Onder uitgevers, 22; Elsevier, Annual reports 1970
and 1971.
92. Wolters Kluwer archives Wolters Samsom, map WSG 460, ‘Bijlage op
internationalisatie Elsevier’, (1975) 9.
93. Ibidem, 8.
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den Brink believed in a differentiated, decentralized firm. ‘‘As a con-
sequence of language, local peculiarities, motivation and patterns of
distribution, publishing differs very much per country. It is therefore
an activity that has to be carried out in a decentralized way.’’94
When Van den Brink retired and Vinken took over in 1979,
acquisitions were at first continued (e.g., Congressional Information
Service Inc. in Washington, the publisher of the American Congress).
But from 1980, the international recession started to hit Elsevier
in about the same way as it affected Kluwer: encyclopedias,
general books, and printing were now losing money; revenue from
advertisements went down, while international scientific publishing
remained very profitable. Elsevier’s reaction was similar to Kluwer’s:
firms publishing general books, newspapers, and magazines were
sold, and so were bookshops and printing firms. Acquisitions abroad
were temporarily halted. (see table 4)
There were also differences between Elsevier and Kluwer, however.
First, Vinken acted quicker and in a harsher way. In 1984, he
announced that firms that did not make a 20 percent profit would
be sold.95 Secondly, unlike Kluwer, he abandoned the idea of a
decentralized company. He argued that this had made sense during
the period of expansion and diversification, but that in adverse times
power should be centralized. The division structure was abolished.
Each part of the firm now reported directly to the Executive Board,
each member of which took responsibility for one of the main
areas of Elsevier’s activities.96 And third, the company was geared
increasingly towards the English language market. Elsevier wanted
to invest especially in the USA, because it considered the European
market too fragmented.97 Vinken was a man of strong opinions,
who liked to express his preference for an Anglo-Saxon style of
management, geared toward quick and high profits for the investors,
and opposed to the soft, ‘‘Christian’’ style he believed to be prevalent
in the Netherlands. ‘‘Enterprise is war’’, he declared in an interview.
He regarded the Dutch language as a dialect doomed to disappear. In
the near future, publishing would largely be in English and would be
concentrated in ten to twenty large companies. He attributed his failed
attempts to integrate the large Dutch publishing firms to differences
94. Elsevier, Annual Report 1976, 8.
95. Elsevier, Annual Report 1984, 9.
96. Elsevier, Annual Report 1981, 9, 11.
97. Elsevier, Annual Report 1984, 9.
194 VAN LENTE AND DE GOEY
Table 4 Elsevier Turnover and Personnel, 1979–1986
1980 1982 1984 1986
Turnover in the Netherlands 1,315 1,292 1,429 1,562
(million guilders)
Index 100 99 108 119
Turnover in American subsidiaries 74 113 172 299
(million guilders)
Index 100 153 232 404
Employees in the Netherlands 8,085 7,206 6,840 6,460
Index 100 89 85 80
Employees abroad 1,431 1,169 1,097 1,397
Index 100 82 77 98
Source: Elsevier annual reports 1979–1986a
a The annual reports do not allow to use exactly the same categories as with Kluwer,
in table 3: instead of presenting the turnover in all countries outside the Netherlands,
as compared to total turnover, we can only show turnover of the American division,
which represents only part of the sales in the USA. Again, ‘‘turnover’’ is ‘‘omzet aan
derden’’.
between his hard-boiled style and the softer Dutch style prevailing in
the other companies.98
In the short run and in financial terms, the new strategy was very
successful. Already in 1984, profits had increased by 40 percent and
Elsevier took the offensive again. During the next few years, several
US firms were taken over, as well as some British ones. Most of these
takeovers were small firms (like Damar and Gordon, and the journals
Laser and optronics and Fiberoptics News), but some were very large,
like the American Springhouse Corporation, for which Elsevier paid
a hundred million dollars.99 Vinken said in 1988, that two-thirds of
Elsevier’s profits were made abroad, and half of that in the USA.100
The next tables (table 5) show that Elsevier succeeded completely in
becoming one of the great scientific publishers in the world.
Conclusions: Patterns of Internationalization
The Kluwer and Elsevier cases confirm several aspects of the
evolutionary theory on the internationalization of business. They
98. For Vinkens views, see two interviews: Van Wermeskerken, De jaren 90,
227–54; Van Amerongen, PJV. For a refutation of the ‘‘dinosaur theory’’, see Noble,
‘‘Mergers and acquisitions of professional and scholarly publishers’’ and Wo¨ssner,
‘‘European media markets in the 1990s’’.
99. Greco, ‘‘Mergers and acquisitions in publishing, 1984–1988’’, 33.
100. Wermeskerken, De jaren 90, 230.
Dutch Multinational Publishing, 1950–1990 195
Table 5 The Largest Scientific Publishers in the World, 1985
Books
Number of titles
Publisher Country (rounded numbers)
Wiley USA 10,000
Academic Press USA 8,000
Elsevier Science Publishers NL 4,000
Plenum USA 4,000
Pergamon UK 3,500
McGraw-Hill USA 3,000
Springer Verlag Germ 2,500
Blackwell Scientific UK 1,650
Journals
Number of titles
Publisher Country (rounded numbers)
Elsevier Science Publishers NL 610
Pergamon UK 367
Springer Verlag Germ 257
Academic Press USA 189
Plenum USA 159
Wiley USA 133
Blackwell Scientific UK 102
Karger Switz 72
Source: P.K. Jagersma, Multinationalisatie van Nederlandse dienstenondernemin-
gen (Tilburg, 1994) 76.
also suggest some qualifications and refinements, which may be
tested in further studies. The cases clearly corroborate the paramount
importance of knowledge and learning in the publishing field, as
well as the importance of the economic and cultural history of the
countries in which publishers build up their savoir faire. As to the
types of knowledge involved and the way these are acquired, we
believe our case studies may add some insights.
There were two basic types of international expansion in the
publishing industry. Scientific publishing was mainly an export
business, which operated upon the world-wide English language
market. The beginning of international scientific publishing in the
Netherlands owed much to German know-how and Hitler’s expulsion
of Germany’s greatest scientific talents. Thus the contingencies of
geography created the first opportunities. The postwar expansion was
part of the rapid growth and internationalization in science, and
the use of the English language after the Second World War. Much
growth could be generated by firms based in the Netherlands, because
the knowledge needed for this type of publishing was least bound
to national cultures. When acquisitions took place, the firms most
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sought after were in Great Britain and the USA, which controlled
specific international market niches.
The second type of expansion was in professional and educational
publishing, which followed a different and more complicated logic.
Fiscal and legal publishing differed fundamentally from scientific
publishing in that the USA and Great Britain, with their very
different legal systems (and the USA with its fifty states with
their own constitutions), were difficult markets from the Dutch
point of view. These branches of publishing, therefore, were more
continental-European, and the publications tended to appear in
different languages, because the information they contained was
more bound to national cultures and laws. This also held for other
professional publications, although to different extents. Technical
works, for example, were often in English. Educational publications,
on the other hand, had to fit into national curricula and were usually
published in different national languages.
In other words, while scientific publishing required a detailed
knowledge of international developments in the sciences, which
could be based in one center in any country, professional
and educational publishing required much more knowledge of
local institutions, laws, and habits. Greenfield investments would,
therefore, be extremely risky. The most effective way to internalize
knowledge of foreign markets was by taking over firms in other
countries. But learning had to proceed in small steps. Taking over a
large firm with a large market share was not only expensive, it would
also create difficulties in integrating the new firm and applying home-
grown management capabilities to the newly acquired activities.
These capabilities constituted another form of knowledge that was
considered crucial in international expansion, besides knowledge
of foreign markets. It was much more implicit, defined in terms of
experience accumulated over a long period of time, a way of doing
things that was critical to Kluwer’s success both at home and abroad.
This ruled out joint ventures in principle, although this form of
cooperation might be used incidentally as well.
But where did the management capabilities come from that gave
Kluwer and Elsevier managers such confidence in going abroad?
Generally speaking, this kind of knowledge was broadly available
in the Netherlands as a consequence of its unusually diversified
and internationally oriented economy. These characteristics go back
to the seventeenth century, but most relevant for our study is the
geographical position of the Netherlands as a nodal point between the
two industrial superpowers of the late nineteenth century, Germany
and Britain, as well its extremely rich colony in the Far East.
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From the nineteen-fifties, when many publishing houses made the
transition from family business to managerial firm, managers who
had started their careers in internationally oriented firms entered the
publishing business. At Kluwer, for example, Gorter could build
on his experience in the East Indies and the textile trade, and
Zevenbergen applied an approach to internationalization he had
learned at ENKA Glanzstoff in Germany.101 The sequence is very
clear in the case of Kluwer. Sanders, Gorter, and Klopper, aided by
experts of the ABN, transformed the family firm into a diversified, and
eventually, an international company. Then Zevenbergen speeded up
internationalization, explicitly applying chemical industry methods
to the publishing business.
The Kluwer case also appears to confirm the existence of a
national management style, which manifested itself in the process
of internationalization as well. The profile drawn up for Kluwer’s
new CEO in 1976 emphasized the need for a cooperative style and
a long-term view, not solely geared to shareholder value. Elsevier’s
Van den Brink, although he seems to have been more autocratic
than the Kluwer managers, confirmed the reasonableness of this
method of management for the publishing business, as we saw.
His successor Vinken however adopted a very different manner.
It is easy to explain this from Vinken’s personality, which made
him embrace an Anglo-Saxon style and reject the ‘‘Dutch Christian
style’’ which he despised. But another explanation seems to be
just as important. Scientific publishing encouraged centralization,
while professional and especially educational publishing required
decentralization. Thus, although national experiences do contribute
to the development of certain styles of management, these styles have
as much to do with the specific characteristics of the publishing
business and of the different kinds of markets publishers work for.
Types of knowledge required for internationalization depended
on markets targeted—more universal in the case of science, more
nationally specific in the case of professional and educational
publishing. More fundamental than these forms of explicit knowledge
weremanagerial skills and capabilities developed during the domestic
expansion of the firms. The publishing houses discussed in this article
imported much of this implicit knowledge from other Dutch firms
which had more international experience.
101. See Willison, ‘‘Massmediatisation’’, 581. For a similar development at
VNU see Johannes and Cohen de Lara, Van Haarlem naar Manhattan, 85.
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